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One of the greatest benefits of our systems is the ease of 
transition from existing security practices, as they are simple 
enough to require neither training nor special equipment such as 
a touchscreen or eye tracker. They work cleanly with the 
password systems and policies already in deployment today. 
 
Not a single intrusion attempt against any of our systems was 
successful. Even so, the findings suggest that lengthening the 
passwords by even one character could increase net security 
while remaining much more usable than current systems. 
 
We strongly recommend against the interval masking commonly 
seen in mobile devices. In light of threats from the ever-growing 
computing power widely available, we seek to expand our work 
to integrate both mobile devices and longer passphrases, which 
our systems are particularly well positioned to support. 
Discussion 
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Abstract 
The need for both usable and secure authentication is more 
pronounced than ever before. Due to their ubiquity, recoverability, 
and low barrier of entry, passwords remain the most common 
means of digital authentication. However, fundamental human 
nature dictates that it is exceedingly difficult for people to generate 
secure passwords on their own. System-generated random 
passwords can be secure but are often unusable, which is why most 
passwords are still created by humans. We developed a simple 
system for automatically generating mnemonic phrases and 
supporting mnemonic images for randomly generated passwords. 
We found that study participants remembered their passwords 
significantly better using our system than with existing systems. To 
combat shoulder surfing – looking at a user’s screen or keyboard as 
he or she enters sensitive input such as passwords – we developed 
an input masking technique that was demonstrated to minimize the 
threat of shoulder surfing attacks while improving the usability of 
password entry over existing methods. 
Introduction 
Although much more secure than user-generated passwords, 
random passwords are hard for people to use due to their inherent 
disorder. To counteract this fact, we can generate mnemonic 
phrases to better remember such passwords. These mnemonics can 
be created either by the user or the system. Converting random 
passwords into mnemonics can prove quite difficult for users, 
suggesting a potential advantage for system-generated mnemonics. 
 
We implemented a system with an iteratively developed wordlist 
that invariably generates drastically simpler phrases compared to 
previous research. We then added the ability for users to create 
pictures to be shown later during recall, as seen in Figure 1. To 
avoid relying on security through obscurity, potential attackers are 
assumed to have complete knowledge of our system, including the 
exact wordlist used and dedicated practice on attacking it. 
 
Since the very act of authentication itself can also be a soft spot for 
unauthorized users to attack, we looked to mitigate the threat of 
shoulder surfing from observers or hidden cameras. Different 
techniques can be employed to hide sensitive input, such as the 
common practice of replacing entered text with bullets. Previous 
input masking research has focused exclusively on increasing 
resistance to shoulder surfing but with a large decrease in usability. 
 
To address this gap, we developed Purloin: an input masking 
technique based on the concept of hiding something in plain view, 
from Edgar Allan Poe’s “The Purloined Letter.” By using decoys to 
mask legitimate input, we strive to combine the usability advantage 
of unmasked text with the security advantage of masked text. 
 
Because the color and position of the genuine password remain 
consistent, Purloin users know where to look for feedback and 
make fewer errors, while attackers are beset by an assortment of 
false passwords. The system defends against camera attacks and 
repeated shoulder surfing attacks by locking out intrusion attempts 
based on any false passwords and notifying the legitimate user. 
Our first study utilized a between-subject design to evaluate the usability and security of our mnemonic 
generation system. Fifty-four participants were assigned, based on a balanced Latin square, to one of the 
following three conditions: no mnemonic, user-created mnemonic following NIST guidelines (Scarfone & 
Souppaya, 2009), or our new system. Each participant was assigned three passwords to be recalled later 
during the first session as well as in a second session after roughly a week. Participants were instructed 
not to write down or rehearse their passwords or mnemonics. To evaluate the security of our system, 
twenty-four participants were extensively trained to attack the created accounts in a follow-up study. 
 
Our second study examined the usability and security of input masking techniques using a within-subject 
repeated measures design. The experimental task was to enter 15 sets of random alphanumeric eight-
character passwords. Fourteen participants were recruited in pairs and took turns as both legitimate 
users and shoulder surfers for all five investigated input masking techniques: 
Cleartext Invisible Bullet Interval Decoy (Purloin) 
bx3jm8vv          •••••••• •••••••v bx3jm8vv 
    nj4vy9hh 
Objective variables measured in both studies included account creation time, login time, error rate, and 
success. The Damerau-Levenshtein distance (Damerau, 1964) and Jaro-Winkler proximity (Winkler, 1990) 
measured security. Subjective variables included NASA-TLX workload indices and SUS usability scores. 
 
For the majority of our dependent variables, we used a one-way ANOVA with a 95% confidence interval 
to determine significance. When appropriate, a log transformation was first applied to achieve normality. 
Given significant results, Tukey’s HSD test showed which conditions differed significantly from one 
another. Success was analyzed using a binary logistic regression. 
Method 
Our mnemonic generation system performed very well across the 
board. Although account creation time for the system-generated 
mnemonic increased, recall time was unaffected. As seen in Figure 
2, users were 1.8 times likelier to succeed with our system than 
with a user-generated phrase and 2.3 times likelier than with no 
phrase. Security with our system was slightly reduced – equivalent 
to losing less than three-fourths of a character in password length. 
 
Purloin performed at the top of both security (see Figure 3) and 
usability (see Figure 4). Bullet masking was secure but near the 
bottom in usability. Interval masking was near the bottom of both. 
Results 
Figure 4. Error rate 
(smaller values indicate increased usability) 
Figure 3. Jaro-Winkler proximity 
(smaller values indicate increased security) 
Figure 2. Second-session success rate 
(larger values indicate increased memorability) 
Figure 1. The mnemonic phrase (left) and picture complement each other as simple but effective memory aids. 
The decoy text (right) obfuscates the typed password while also acting as a trap for potential attackers. 
